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This paper explores the roles of capital- and technology-skill complementarities in labor
allocation decisions within the U.S. Navy. During the latter 19th century the ocer corps
was highly specialized, and was split between groups of line and sta ocers. This was also
a time of dramatic technological changes which aected nearly every facet of naval opera-
tions. Specically, naval technological developments tended to be \engineering-biased," in
that they raised the relative importance of engineer-oriented skills. This created a dilemma
for the Navy, as it navigated the balance between the benets of a specialized workforce
implementing increasingly complex technologies with rising communication and coordina-
tion costs. We rst document the extent of capital- and technology-skill complementarities
within the navy which fostered greater labor specialization. We then show how the Navy
vitiated the specialized human capital of ocers by blending the corps. The study oers in-
sights into how an industry undergoing wrenching technological changes managed its labor
and human capital allocation to help the U.S. become a world class naval power.
 Keywords: skilled-labor complementarity, skill-replacing and skill-using technology,
labor allocation
 JEL Codes: J2, J7, N3, N7, O3
21 Introduction
This paper explores the eects of capital- and technology-skill complementarities in the U.S.
Navy. Specically, we explore how such complementarities inuenced task specialization and
labor allocation during the latter 19th and early 20th centuries. The exploration provides us a
glimpse into how a large and complex bureaucracy handled dramatic technological changes during
a formative period in American economic history. Goldin and Katz (1998) document capital-skill
complementarities in U.S. manufacturing as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century.
Earlier periods however remain mysterious to us due to data limitations. Here we look to the
various relations between workers, capital and technologies in a critical and dramatically evolving
organization.
We view the vessel as a oating rm, an island of productivity in which technology-embodied
capital is employed by various types of skilled and unskilled labor in pursuit of the objectives of
the voyage. The specic objectives, be they to blockade trade, or to engage in gunboat diplomacy,
or to provide a vague appearance of power projection, are for the most part opaque to us. But
as the United States during the latter 19th century transitioned from its traditional limited
strategy of commerce raiding and shore protection (guerre de course) to a far more muscular
naval strategy (guerre d'escadre), these endeavors grew increasingly vital to the health of U.S.
commerce and security (Buhl 1978).1 In this sense the Navy was a critical \industry" in the
overall economy, one from which we can learn a great deal.2
This transition posed some major challenges for the Navy. One of the big debates among top
naval brass was over the degree of specialization among members of the ocer corps. The tech-
nological and structural changes happening within the Navy tended to be \engineering-biased,"
in that they raised the relative importance of engineering skill in naval operations. As these
operations grew increasingly complex, they Navy could conceivably raise productivity through
1Examples abound where the Navy was used as a tool of macroeconomic policy. One such example was the
United States' \gunboat diplomacy" in Latin America, which began in the mid-1890s and was motivated in part
by concerns over debt repayment (Reinhart and Rogo 2009).
2See for example Glaser and Rahman (2011, 2012). Some words of caution from a military historian are worth
noting - \The past - even if we could be condent of interpreting it with high accuracy - rarely oers direct
lessons" (Paret 1986). Indeed, but the issues raised technological change within the naval steamship can surely
provide indirect evidence of the eects of industrialization on labor for the other complex industries of the day.
3a more extensive division of labor, where each ocer could focus on a narrower range of tasks.
However, these changes could also exacerbate communication and coordination costs among o-
cers, in which case a more generic or supercial division of labor might be more productive. The
balance is one which all productive entities need to strike - when should an organization maintain
a highly-specialized workforce, and when should it have a more homogenous one (Borghans and
Weel 2006)?
The U.S. Navy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries makes for an informative case study
on this balancing act. This study provides an important glimpse into how how technology
aected labor allocation and specialization in history.3 During this time the ocer corps was
highly specialized, and due to legislation passed in 1867 was split between groups of line and
sta ocers (McBride 2000). More specically, there were generally two kinds of skilled workers:
regular line ocers (who acted as managers) and naval engineers (who acted as technocrats);
these skilled laborers worked with technology-embodied capital (the naval vessel) and unskilled
labor (the vessel's complement of sailors). In this context, we attempt to observe the extent of
each skilled labor-type's complementarities with capital, raw labor, evolving naval technology,
and each other. We also study the Navy's reaction to these inherent complementarities, and
how it balanced its needs of accomplishing many specialized tasks with its needs for a more
homogenous workforce with similar naval skills and training.
We exploit a unique dataset that contains the names and proles of ocers who joined the
Navy between the years 1865 to 1905, as well as the names and proles of every serving naval
engineer from 1870 to 1899. We match merge this information with their duty and service records.
We also record the names, personnel, characteristics and station of every U.S. naval vessel from
1870 to 1911. The nal compilation gives us the singular ability to link dierent kinds of physical
capital, human capital and technologies for a dynamic and developing organization in the 19th
and early 20th centuries.
Our analysis uncovers a number of things. Prior to 1899 (when the ocer corps was de-
lineated between line and sta ocers), there were very clear capital-skill and technology-skill
complementarities in \naval production." More specically, proxies for technology and naval
3\There is hardly any part of economics that would not be advanced by a further analysis of [labor] special-
ization" (Houthakker 1956).
4capital positively aect the numbers of both ocers and engineers assigned to active vessels.
Further, these proxies also positively aect the number of engineers relative to ocers. On the
other hand, ocers appear to strongly complement unskilled labor in service on active ships.
The ndings suggest that naval labor during this time was highly specialized - management-type
skills worked closely with personnel, whereas engineer-type skills worked less with people and
more with machinery and technical apparatus.
We also nd that these technology-skill complementarities changed dramatically after 1899.
Specically, the Navy made a concerted eort of vitiating the specialized human capital of the
ocer corps through labor amalgamation. Through this the Navy stressed a more generalized
skill set among all naval personnel rather than specialized skills. However the Navy was still able
to allocate labor according to more intensive measures of human capital, through the skills and
experience embedded in ocers. This was likely important for the Navy to continue to develop
and implement engineer-intensive technologies and keep apace of naval developments in England
and elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background and moti-
vation. Section 3 gives some details on our empirical strategy, and section 4 describe the data.
Section 5 details our results.
2 Background
2.1 The Engineer-Bias of Naval Technological Change
The late 19th century Navy employed a heterogenous eet of vessels which were built between
the 1850s and 1890s. All these were steamships, but they had dramatically dierent technological
designs which were highly dependent on the years of their conceptions.4 This was a transformative
era for both the Navy and the greater economy; studying this era thus provides us with a
unique opportunity to examine the use of capital, since each vessel embodied dierent types of
technologies.
Naval operations have always been fairly technical.5 Yet nearly every facet of the naval ship
4\What a motley assemblage [the old ships] were! Monitors with rusting armor and rotting or rusting hulls,
wooden cruisers limited to 7 or 8 knots under steam" (Vlahos 1989).
5Even back in 1637, the English warship Sovereign of the Seas was likely the most complex man-made con-
5underwent radical technological transformation during the latter 19th century. These changes
included the switch from sail to steam propulsion, the ironcladding of wooden hulls, the full
construction of iron hulls, the switch from paddle-wheels to propellers, and the implementation
of ried barrels and exploding projectiles in naval ordnance. Indeed, \by century's end, warships
were complex systems that bore little resemblance to those fty years earlier"(McBride 2000).
All these changes occurred progressively and chronologically through the latter 19th century,
and required ocers who could master the technologies being newly implemented. The naval
profession in fact was being transformed into a technology- and science-based profession. Similar
transformations were occurring in many manufacturing industries throughout the Western world
(Mokyr 2002), particularly in those involving steam and mechanical engineering.6
Change came sluggishly at rst, particularly during the 1870s and early 80s. Some of this was
due to American postbellum withdrawal from the international scene, and a renewed focus on
southern reconstruction and westward expansion (Peterson 1986). But resistance to change was
common even before the war - in 1857 for example, instead of experimenting with large steamships
with screw propulsion designs and armored hulls to emulate the British Royal Navy, Congress
approved the construction of ve large but wooden hulled, shallow-draft sloops (Tomblin 1988).
Battles over ship designs between line ocers and naval engineers which began in the 1850s
fostered a kind of technological stasis up through the 1870s - the Navy settled on romantic ship
congurations rather than make bold changes to the battleship paradigm (McBride 2000).
Perhaps the biggest factor contributing to the chariness for change was the acknowledgement
(and fear) that such developments would inevitably be engineering-skill biased, empowering en-
gineers over traditional line ocers. It became increasingly clear that engineering had grown in
importance in the employment and maintenance of naval power during the Civil War (Davis and
Engerman 2006), and was only becoming more important the post-bellum world.
Yet because of delays in technological adoption during the 1870s and 80s, the Navy also
employed many ships of antiquated design and ability. The conversion of the fast cruising
Madawaska to the steam frigate Tennessee during the early 1870s is a classic example. Like
many vessel conversions during this time, the Tennessee essentially became a \totem of romantic
struction in all of England at the time (McBride 2000).
6\The protestations of some economic historians notwithstanding, the steam engine is still widely regarded as
the quintessential invention of the Industrial Revolution" (Mokyr 1990).
6tradition," complete with white oak hull and all of the traditional ship ttings of the old sailing
navy (Vlahos 1989). These ships were designed not so much to ght as to merely give the impres-
sion of being able to ght. Ship designers were in fact directed to embrace naval anachronisms.
A general order in 1869 for example directed that\hereafter all vessels of the navy will be tted
with full sail power...Commanders of squadrons will direct that constant exercises shall take place
with sails and spars" (Bennett 1896). Even as late as 1897, the Naval Academy authorized the
building of training vessels propelled only by sail. Engineer-in-Chief George Melville found it
\incredible that a sailing ship should be used for the training of men who are to serve on and
command vessels entirely propelled by machinery and without any sails."7
But engineer-oriented change did come. During the 1880s there were two distinct waves of
technological development - the construction of the armored ABCD ships, and the four modern
heavy cruisers Texas, Maine, New York, and Olympia. The navy thus began its attempts to
converge to the technological frontier in earnest by the 80s. For example in 1886 American
ocers made technical pilgrimages to Europe, paying $2500 to purchase foreign designs of naval
warships (Vlahos 1989). The development of the Charleston in 1887 owed much of its design to
imitations of British vessels (Bennett 1896).
After this an even greater push for modernization was made by Secretary of the Navy Benjamin
Tracy, who established the Board of Construction in 1889 to coordinate the bureaus' eorts to
produce optimal warship designs themselves (McBride 2000). The vessels subsequently built and
launched were radically dierent in both design and ability. In fact to some, \the new navy [was]
one so dierent from much that [had] preceded...as to make it a subject by itself, only slightly
connected with all that [had] gone before" (Bennett 1896). Yet from the end of the war to the
beginnings of this \new navy," some forty new war steamers had been added to the Fleet (Vlahos
1989), contributing to the radical mix of ship designs extant in the late 19th century Navy.
Along with propulsion, vessels began to develop steam engineering techniques to clear bilges of
water. Further, as vessels began to increase in size, steering by manual labor became increasingly
onerous and new steam techniques to steer ships were developed and implemented (Smith 1938).
The increase in the size of naval guns also led to the introduction of machinery for controlling
them. As early as 1861 there existed a system of mounting heavy guns on a turntable, the
7Melville's Stevens Institute Speech, Melville Papers.
7revolution, gun motion and recoil all powered by steam. Such turrets worked by steam became
standard in newer vessels, replacing wooden carriages and manual labor.
These are but a few examples of how technical changes were altering the optimal mix of skilled
labor aboard vessels. Steam was applied to pumping, steering, the working of guns, the distilling
of water, and the charging of torpedoes, along with its traditional role in propulsion. But how the
Navy actually allocated engineering and traditional skills across the eet remains unexplored. For
example, according to one article from the late-19th century, a steam frigate of 1000 horsepower
in 1865 had nine engineers; in 1896 an armored steam cruiser of 17,000 horsepower had only ve.8
We wish to inquire, among other things, whether this example was emblematic of replacement of
engineers on technologically advanced vessels, or rather an interesting exception to the general
rule of greater engineering skills employed on such vessels.
The convergence to the naval technological frontier happened in earnest starting in the 1890s,
and culminated in the building and launching of the Great White Fleet in the nineteen-aughts.
This clearly involved a massive and unprecedented embrace of engineering technologies. The
technological developments of the navy thus mirrored in many ways American industry - rela-
tively backward in the 1870s and 80s, yet rapidly developing by the 90s with a renewed focus on
competing with the industrial superpowers of Britain and Germany (Vlahos 1989).
So how did these developments inuence labor allocation in the Navy? Further, how did the
Navy handle (and eventually overcome) the fear among traditionalists that their roles would be
subservient and their skills would become irrelevant? The 19th century U.S. Navy, made up of
a mongrel mix of old and new ships, provides us a rich environment to explore these questions.
2.2 Naval Engineering and the Pre-Amalgamated Line
The post-bellum navy was split into various ocer-corps factions. By dint of legislation
passed in 1867, the corps was split between traditional line ocers and engineer ocers, forming
an organization with a fairly specialized labor structure. During this period naval personnel
was \pre-amalgamated" - that is, line and engineer ocers had explicitly separate duties. One
primary question is would (and should) the Navy embrace such a specialized framework as new
8from \Queer Doings in the Navy," Scientic Machinist, July 1, 1896.
8technologies continued to be developed and implemented?
As studies such as Acemoglu (2007) suggest, capital-augmenting technological progress should
increase the relative demand for labor in a two-factor production process when capital and labor
are grossly complementary. This could be a fairly apt description of the Navy - technological
developments embodied in vessels greatly raised the need for skilled personnel. One ocer
described the diculties the navy had in progressing technologically as arising from the failure
of \ocers in high position to realize the duality of the naval profession; to realize that a navy
consists of both personnel and material; the two of equal importance, and each useless without
the other" (McBride 1992).
Further, such developments were likely biased towards particular skills. For example, Chin et
al. (2006) nd that technological developments in the merchant shipping industry during the late
19th century created a greater demand for engineers and tended to replace moderately-skilled
able-bodied seamen. So how did naval technological developments inuence skill-labor personnel
in the 19th century?
Again, we need to look to the data to discern the patterns. The historiography suggest that
during the latter 19th century ocers and engineers had radically dierent functions. The engi-
neers allegedly served as an indispensable corps with extensive scientic and technical expertise,
the \inspectors and constructors of machinery," and those also with \practical ability if the
ship's machinery were to be kept in an ecient condition" (Bennett 1896). Ocers by contrast
specialized in seamanship, navigation, weaponry and general strategy. This separation persisted
up until the Amalgamation Act of 1899 - through this period the fear of \the sailor swallowing
the engineer, or the engineer swallowing the sailor" had not yet come to pass (Bennett 1896).
Thus in evaluating potential complementarities, we need to look at these two types of skilled
workers separately in the usage and operation of vessels.9
At heart here is the debate over the role of specialization and the proper division of labor
as technologies evolve.10 In many respects progress and greater labor specialization go hand in
hand. Specialization generates classic gains from trade, and expertise develops through learning
9Edelstein (2001) stresses how proper complementarity measurements between dierent laborer-types is im-
portant for growth accounting, citing Field-Hendrey (1988, 1998) who demonstrate the lack of substitutability
between labor of dierent servitude-status or gender.
10See Borghans and Weel 2006 for a study of labor specialization with computer technology adoption.
9by doing particular tasks. Indeed, productivity can rise directly through the specialization of
labor (Kim and Mohtadi 1992). And complicated tasks require a great deal of specialization to
minimize the potential of failure (Kremer 1993).
Naval developments particularly suggested the need for a specialized ocer corps. As tech-
nologies became more engineer-oriented, the Navy needed a core group of experts to manage and
implement these changes. Bennett (1896) stresses the critical need for engineers during this time
as the primary inspectors and constructors of machinery, and as directors of \the most needful
ghting factor in the ship - power." Such responsibilities could not be heaped upon regular line
ocers, since they generally had no idea about the workings of steam technologies. A telling
account comes from Commander R. S. Robinson of the Royal Navy, who wrote in 183911
We go into the engine room, we look at the outside of an engine, various rods of highly
polished iron are moving about, a beam is observed vibrating up and down, all is clean
and bright and well arranged, but the working parts of the engine, the moving power is
entirely shut out from our sight, and after staying a few minutes and, perhaps, asking
a question or two, which from the very depths of ignorance it betrays, it is scarcely
possible the engineer can or will answer, we walk up again, with no additions to our
knowledge, and rather convinced that the whole subject is incomprehensible.
This tale of technological bewilderment was a common refrain among line ocers in the
19th century U.S. Navy, suggesting the deeply complementary and specialized nature of ocer
functions. Allen (1976) describes at length a new \corporate" form of organization needed
to embrace and implement new naval technologies - \specialization had to replace Old Navy
self-suciency and omni-competence; cooperation (between near-equals) or `teamwork' had to
replace aristocratic monopolization of command privileges." No longer could ocers embrace
\aristocratic individualism," where every ocer understood every component of naval operations.
In the New Navy, one type of ocer relied on another type for guidance and expertise.
Yet there were also a number of perceived costs from such specialization, and the potential
shortcomings of greater labor divisions occupied naval dialectics for decades. For one, economists
have often described rising communication costs among personnel as a potential hindrance to
11Taken from Robinson (1839), Nautical Steam Engine Explained and its Powers and Capabilities Described for
the Use of the Ocers of the Navy.
10specialization patterns. Autor (2001) describes how infrequent use of specialized workers can
reduce transaction costs and thereby raise gains from specialization. Yet naval developments
during this time arguably worked in reverse - as technologies grew, the need for engineers grew
with it. But this raised transaction costs, and thus decreased potential gains from specialization.
Another problem was the coordination necessary to link complementary ocers and engineers
with naval capital. Determining which ships and people were at which stations, and which should
be matched upon deployment, was surely an impossibly complex process. An organization simply
becomes less limber with a higher degree of specialized labor.12 Coordination on the other hand
becomes easier when all personnel have similar backgrounds and skills. Thus the \many sudden
emergencies and trying circumstances attending the war operations of the navy" described by
Bennett (1896) could require both theoretical knowledge and practicable ability for many ocers,
not merely a few engineering specialists. The \omni-competence" of labor described by Allen
(1976) provides convenience, particulary given the uncertainties of future naval operations.13
Technological changes that generate greater complementarities can also produce a more sclerotic
structure. Indeed organizations of all kinds must strike a balance between the productivity of
its individual workers and the limberness of its whole workforce.
Yet another concern over a highly specialized ocer corps was that it could create a \separate
but equal" dynamic in the workplace, stoking internal strife within the service and potentially
fostering an internecine war between line and engineer ocers. Engineers were physically sep-
arated from ocers, working below decks out of sight and often out of mind (McBride 2000).
This separation manifested itself in many adverse ways. The most common complaint among
engineers was that they were typically not permitted the use of the wardroom for mess and
sleeping quarters (Calvert 1967). Yet such petty issues could magnify into serious hindrances
for naval development. High ranking ocials such as David Porter (Superintendent of the Naval
12Fleet limberness has been of key importance for modern navies. Fleet Admiral Ernest King attributed the
U.S. Navy's victory in the Pacic during World War II to the \exibility and balanced character of our naval
forces." (Introduction, \Third Report of Operations of the United States Navy in World War II, 1 March 1945
- 1 October 1945," in Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945: Ocial Reports to the
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 1946, 169.)
13Hadeld (1999) explains customary gender divisions of labor as a mechanism that mitigates coordination
problems in the marriage market. But while household technologies have been fairly stagnant for millennia,
technological changes in other organizations can severely disrupt such coordination. Thus a modern Navy might
be considered like a modern marriage - everyone is responsible for everything.
11Academy during the latter 1860s) and Alfred Mahan often referred to engineers pejoratively and
resisted engineer-biased technological changes (Bennett 1896). Those who embraced a more ho-
mogenized corps envisioned an engineering background for all ocers, so that engineer-oriented
developments would be better understood and embraced. Furthermore, naval operations could
be jeopardized if ghting eciency depended upon the technical understanding of the captain
and a close relationship with his engineers.14
Finally, conicts stoked by the separation between the old guard of line ocers and new sta
ocers may have contributed to technological stagnation and outright naval decline (Karsten
1972, Allen 1976). Because the old guard viewed engineer-oriented developments as destruction
rather than progress, they resisted them, often successfully (Coletta 1987). This created a further
impetus for engineers to leave naval service, as developments in private industry dramatically
raised the relative pecuniary rewards in private-sector engineer-oriented professions (Glaser and
Rahman 2012).15 Such a hollowing out of the skilled workforce posed yet more problems for a
Navy attempting to modernize.
2.3 Naval Education in the Pre-Amalgamation Era
During this period all line ocers, and a great many sta ocers, received their pre-service
education at the United States Naval Academy. As the academic and educational arm of the
Navy, the Academy likewise grappled with the tradeos between generalized and specialized
human capital for the ocer corps. While specialized education can improve worker productivity
for a given activity, a generalized education renders workers more adaptable to a variety of
activities (Kim 1989). Throughout this period the Naval Academy wildly oscillated in its focus
between the former (training and educating future line and engineer ocers separately for the
last two years of their studies) and the latter (where midshipmen all went through the same
program and took a combination of \traditional" and engineering classes).
The Academy always had its \generalists" who wished to combine the talents of line and
14McBride (2000) draws the amusing parallel between the post-bellum U.S. Navy and the Starship Enterprise,
where it seems that in both cases ocers and engineers operated very separately. \[With] Captain Kirk's Star
Trek dealings with Chief Engineer Scott,...the captain demanded more power, speed or shield strength with no
interest in how Scott's engineers provided it."
15Evidence of the explosive growth in engineer employment in manufacturing abounds. In 1880 there were 7061
engineers in the U.S.; at the turn of the century there were 43,239 (Blank and Stigler 1957).
12engineer ocers into the same individuals, and they pursued their vision with intermittent vigor
in the post-bellum period. Steam was made part of the curriculum for all students in 1861
(Calvert 1967). Engineer-in-Chief Benjamin Isherwood stressed to Secretary of the Navy Gideon
Wells the need to revamp engineering instruction at the Academy. Soon after the Department
of Steam Engineering was established. In his 1864 annual report, Secretary Wells described the
labor allocation issues stemming from \the radical changes which have been wrought by steam
as a motive power for naval vessels." Because it seemed that ocers were capable of performing
only a few specialized tasks, \[we should make] our ocers engine-drivers as well as sailors...we
should begin by teaching each midshipman to be able to discharge the duties of line ocers and
engineers, to combine the two into one profession, so that ocers so educated can take their watch
alternatively in the engine-room and on deck."16 When the Academy returned to Annapolis in
1865, Congress appropriated $20,000 for new facilities for the engineering department (Bennett
1896). Secretary Wells applauded the new facilities, urging for their maximum use and warning
that line ocer untrained in steam engineering would be \taking a secondary position" within
the profession.17
Yet due to the specialized needs of the eet, the Academy also episodically oered a program
that graduated engineer ocers.18 Cadet engineers would enroll in a two year program focused
on steam and mechanical engineering after completing their rst two years of regular ocer
instruction. The program began in 1866, graduating its rst group of engineers in 1868, but
ended immediately after due to funding. The program was reinstated in 1872, abolished again
in 1882 due to the Personnel Act, and established once more in 1888 (Calvert 1967).
Thus in three distinct waves the Academy produced engineer ocers who worked along with
line ocers aboard naval vessels. But 1899 was the last ever graduating class of the engineer-cadet
program. Why did the program end?
16From the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1864.
17From the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1866.
18Before this time engineers came exclusively from private organizations and were considered non-commissioned
personnel.
132.4 The Post-Amalgamated Line
In 1899 engineering ocers were simply absorbed into the \new line." Deemed the Amal-
gamation Act of 1899, the action was a direct result of a study made by the Personnel Board
under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt two years before
(McBride 2000). According to Roosevelt, \On the modern war vessel, every ocer has to be an
engineer whether he wants to or not."19 Thus amalgamation was the implicit expression among
naval leadership that the generalists had in eect won the debate, and the recognition of the
necessity of engineering training for all naval ocers. A common refrain was that \the modern
ship is a machine...All the problems on a modern battleship are engineering in their nature, and
there is no problem which cannot be solved by the man whose early education has been largely
in mechanics and engineering."20
More broadly, amalgamation manifested the awareness that America remained fairly weak
in human capital, and that industrial technologies required a workforce with backgrounds in
technical training and professionalism (Vlahos 1989). The embrace of naval engineering for its
entire personnel suggested the Navy echoed broader industrial demands for the United States to
become a global competitor and a world power.
The Navy had to respond to the order, both on the education and the labor allocation fronts.
The Naval Academy retooled its curriculum to once again produce omni-competent ocers, but
there was the fear that new graduates would be long on breadth and short on depth. Furthermore,
the Amalgamation Act in fact did not require midshipmen to study more engineering, while it did
require naval engineers to pass a test on seamanship to qualify as deck watch ocers (McBride
2000). The chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering saw the potential aw of the new design
in 1904: \So few ocers of the line are taking up engineering seriously that the situation is
becoming alarming" (McBride 2000).
Yet amalgamation also had its staunch defenders. In a 1905 article lieutenant commander
Lloyd Chandler presented an extensive defense of the new amalgamated line. He forcefully
painted the merger of ocer human capital as a necessary one in order for the U.S. to compete
in world naval aairs, claiming that the \blindness of caste [that ruled]...that a man cannot be
19Papers of George H. Melville, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
20Ira N. Hollis quoted in the Army and Navy Journal in 1897.
14a military ocer and a mechanic at the same time" was once and for all destroyed.21
Amalgamation was a watershed in the institutional history of the U.S. Navy, one from which
labor and historical economists may learn. It destroyed the de jure distinction between line and
sta; there remained however a core group of erstwhile engineers who suddenly had line ocer
status. Were their education and backgrounds reallocated in a fundamentally dierent way? How
did the Navy alter its labor allocation strategy? Did there remain a de facto extensive human
capital margin upon which the Navy continued to operate, and if not would naval operations be
jeopardized?
3 Empirical Framework
To empirically analyze some of the themes raised in the last section with reduced form spec-
ications, we regress alternative measures of skilled labor and skill-intensity levels on a set of
ship characteristics. These will be panel estimations at the ship-year unit of observation.22
For many of these, we split the analysis between 1870-1899 (pre-amalgamation) and 1901-1911
(post-amalgamation). We are interested in learning how the Navy allocated its labor during a
period when it, at least ocially, embraced specialization, versus how it did so when it stressed
homogenization.
3.1 Engineer and ocer counts
To estimate the eects of capital and technology on the number of skilled workers assigned to
specic vessels, we dene y as a non-negative count variable with integer values 0;1;2;:::. Speci-
cally this represents the total number of engineers or ocers assigned to ships. Poisson regression
is a natural empirical specication for the analysis of count data such as this. An examination
of the distribution of engineers and ocers shown in gure 3 provides further motivation for the
assumption of a Poisson model. Following Wooldridge (2002), the conditional mean given the
vector x is dened E(yjx;;) = exp(x). Initially, we assume E(jx) = E() = 1, which
implies that standard quasi-maximum likelihood techniques (QML) consistently estimate the
21Lt. Commander L. H. Chandler, \Is Amalgamation a Failure?" USNIP 31 (1905): 823-943.
22McBride (2000) describes how the battleship is the most relevant observational unit for our period of study:
\During this period, the battleship technological paradigm was dominant, and the battleship retained strategic
importance even after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941."
15parameters of the model. Our interest is in the K 1 vector of parameters in .23 Results from
these regressions are reported in tables 2   5 for ships serving at sea both for the 19th century
and the early 20th century.
3.1.1 Endogenous engineer and ocer counts
While convenience leads one to assume statistical independence of  and x, our con-
ceptual framework allows for the possibility that ship allocations of ocers and engineers are
both endogenous variables. In particular, the lack of substitutability between types of skilled
labor suggests a failure of the assumption for conditional mean independence, which means
E(jx) 6= E(). Mullahy (1997) details how standard QML techniques produce inconsistent
estimates of  when this assumption fails; however, he also outlines estimation methods using
two-stage QML and GMM techniques that mitigate the endogeneity problem and generate more
consistent parameter estimates.
Similar to IV specications found in standard contexts, our IV specications will need a p1
vector of exogenous instruments, z, where p  K. The p instruments may include elements of
x not correlated with . We report estimates of IV estimations following from these methods in
table 6.
3.2 Measures of skill intensity
We also exploit the various measures of skill and the panel structure of the data to evaluate
how changes in the capital and technological characteristics of ships lead to changes in the mix
of skills assigned to ships. Which attributes led ship operations to rely on more experienced
(and possibly less technically savvy) ocers, or on those ocers who performed well in certain
subjects in college (in this case the Naval Academy)? What causes the share of engineers relative
to line ocers in various vessels to change over time? To answer these questions, we uncover the
factors that change labor skill intensity aboard vessels.
The unobserved eects model estimates various measures of skill intensity on ship i over time
t following the specication
yit = xit + ci + uit ; t = 1;2;::::;T : (1)
23We also include parameters estimated under Poisson specications with random eects.
16The random variable ci controls for unobserved ship heterogeneity and improves estimate e-
ciency in the K  1 vector . By construction, estimates follow from the assumption that ci is
not correlated with xit. Results from FGLS estimation of a variety of skill measures on ships
using (1) appear in tables 8   11.
4 Data
Our core empirical strategy regresses various measures of skill on a variety of ship character-
istics. In order to do this of course we need to match ocers and engineers to particular vessels.
We accomplish this primarily by exploiting information compiled in ocial U.S. Navy Registers.
These annual volumes published by the United States Navy document the duty and station of
every serving ocer and every naval vessel. From these volumes we determine the names and
numbers of ocers and engineers assigned to each vessel each year, as well as the station (lo-
cation/tour) of each vessel. There are typically core groups of each skilled labor-type during
each ship's international tour, but nevertheless a remarkable degree of year-to-year uctuation
in personnel exists even during the same tours.24
Primary data extracted from the Navy Registers is matched with three other sources. The rst
is the appendix of Bennett (1896), which lists every serving naval engineer up until 1896. This
is used to construct basic experience measures for each engineer. This work also includes a list
of vessels and basic ship attributes such as displacement, ship dimension, and year of build. The
second source, the Dictionary of Fighting Ships, augments ship information in Bennett (1896).
This also includes newer vessels and other vessel traits such as the complement (the number of
sailors and other crew members) and ship cruising speeds.
Finally, we use Naval Academy registers to document ocer performance as midshipmen at
the Academy on a variety of subjects for the graduating classes of 1865 - 1905.25 This also
allows us to track each ocer's class year, and thus produce basic experience measures for ship
personnel. We obviously do not have a one-for-one mapping between personnel and their Naval
Academy education, and this is due to a number of factors. The primary reason is lack of
24For example, a vessel could be stationed in the Pacic for ve years while the ocer and engineer counts
aboard vessels vary year to year as the ship docks at ports and personnel change stations.
25See Glaser and Rahman (2011), where we discuss this data at greater length.
17coverage - for vessels during the 1870s we only have information for relatively younger ocers;
for vessels after 1905 we do not have any information on newly commissioned ocers. Further,
many engineers employed by the Navy were not commissioned ocers and did not go through
the Academy; this is particularly true for the earlier part of our data series. Nevertheless, we are
able to link ocers with their Academy proles for the majority of our sample.
The nal match-merged data includes the personnel, personnel attributes, status and charac-
teristics of every active U.S. naval vessel from 1870 to 1911. This span of time generates a wide
range of steam vessel-types and enables us to track factors linked to very dierent technologically-
embodied ships; technological proxies include the age of the vessel and its speed (the age proles
of all active vessels are illustrated in gure 1). At the same time, our study deals both in the
pre-amalgamation age (so that we analyze two distinct skill-types) and the post-amalgamation
age (where such distinctions were at least de jure eviscerated). Descriptive statistics for ship
characteristics of vessels active in naval power projection (out at sea) appear in table 1.
Finally, we include year eects for all regressions. These conceivably important controls reduce
bias from the omission of time-specic factors such as changes to naval budgets, variations in
aggregate naval personnel, and shifts in strategy and international relations.26
26Particularly important is controlling for the build-up and draw-down of battle readiness from 1897 to 1899
due to the Spanish-American War.
18Table 1: Descriptive statistics of ships (conditional on active service)
ship characteristics observations mean standard deviation minimum maximum
engineers (ship-year observation) 1370 2.19 2.01 0 10
ocers (ship-year observation) 1327 7.05 3.22 0 18
perc. engineers (ship-year observation) 1297 0.216 0.174 0 1
age (ship-year observation) 1345 12.94 7.94 1 46
avg. ocer experience (ship-year observation) 748 14.5 5.1 0.26 35.20
max speed (knots) 188 13.4 4.1 4 30
displacement (1000 tons) 205 3.86 4.19 0.042 20.38
length (feet) 205 259.54 91.70 70 518
complement (sailors) 175 297.04 231.04 12 1108
cumulative time at sea (ship-year observation) 1370 5.49 4.62 1 33
195 Results
5.1 Engineer counts
Our rst empirical exercise regresses the concentrations of engineer personnel or line ocers
aboard active vessels on vessel characteristics including variables controlling for size, age, per-
sonnel measures and sea experience. For these we use Poisson pooled and Poisson random eects
regressions, since dependent variables are count variables with nearly equal mean and variance.
The count proles of both engineers and ocers aboard active vessels are illustrated in gure
3, while descriptive statistics for variables included in all regressions appear in table 1. Many
ship-characteristic variables are not time dependent - these include measures of displacement (in
thousand tons), length (in feet) and complement (the total number of ship personnel as recorded
in the Dictionary of Fighting Ships). Variables that evolve over time include the age of the ves-
sel, the cumulative number of years since 1870 that the ship has been active at sea (\cumulative
sea"), and the number of naval ocers assigned to the vessel. Some specications (indicated
on each table) include cohort interactions, which are combinations of vessel ages and the year
dummy variables. These essentially capture and control for the vintage of ships. For example,
a 5 year old ship observed in 1880 likely has less advanced technology than a 5 year old ship
observed in 1885. Finally, given the heterogeneity in our sample of vessels (e.g. some ships as
small as 70 feet long, with others over 500 feet long), we control for additional non-linearities
in technology using quadratic regressors. These allows us capture points at which expanding
demand for skilled labor on vessels begin to level-o.
20Table 2: Poisson regressions of engineers assigned to active vessels on vessel
characteristics (1870-1899)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vessel age -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.020 -0.074 0.043 -0.029 -0.037
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.030) (0.06) (0.129) (0.030) (0.034)
vessel age squared - - - - - - 0.0003 0.002
(0.0004) (0.0005)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.135*** 0.110*** 0.085*** 0.101*** 0.472*** 0.425*** 0.403*** 0.452***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.02) (0.02) (0.097) (0.111) (0.034) (0.073)
displacement squared - - - - - - -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.005)
length (feet) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004 0.007* 0.003* -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0015) (0.003)
length squared - - - - - - -6.54e-6** -8.39e-7
(2.94e-6) (5.07e-6)
cum sea - -0.002 0.002 0.013 0.048 0.069** 0.049*** 0.066***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.033) (0.033) (0.016) (0.019)
cum sea squared - - - - - - -0.002** -0.002**
(0.0008) (0.0008)
complement - - 0.00005 -0.00007 - -0.0002 - 0.001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.001)
complement squared - - - - - - - -2.37e-6
(1.66e-6)
ocers - 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.092*** 0.087***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.013) (0.029) (0.039) (0.0016) (0.038)
ocers squared - - - - - - -0.0004*** -0.0004**
(0.0016) (0.0019)
observations 784 784 579 579 784 579 784 579
no. of vessels 123 123 92 92 123 92 123 92
pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 - - 0.18 0.18
year eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no no no yes yes yes yes yes
2 of age*cohort interactions - - - 310.29*** 112.33*** 135.2*** 109.96*** 108.6***
random ship eects no no no no yes yes no no
standard errors shown in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
21Table 2 presents results for engineer counts serving on active ships at sea for the years 1870-
1899, the estimates of which derive from the empirical methodology outlined in section 3:1.
In pooled regressions, estimates support our basic hypotheses for the presence of technology-
skill and capital-skill complementarities in naval activity. With respect to capital, displacement
and length positively aect the roll of engineers. Columns (1)-(3) show results from pooled
regressions which do not include cohort eects to control for vintage. In these specications the
results clearly indicate that larger, longer and newer ships received more engineers, i.e. the more
technically inclined skilled labor. One consequence of pooling of course is that the disturbances
may be correlated within groups, leading to serial correlation and less ecient estimates. One
can think of the naive pooled regression as having a disturbance term divided conceptually into
two parts, a random component, uit and a group share ci. The estimates in columns (5)-(6)
should be more ecient than pooled regression, but still may run the risk of omitted variables,
eroding the unbiasedness of estimates.
For most specications, chi-squared tests support the inclusion of age-cohort interactions.27
Regardless of their vintage, older ships always require fewer engineers than newer vessels. That is,
5-year-old vessels in 1884 require more engineers than 10-year-old vessels in 1884, and 5-year-old
vessels in 1899 requires more engineers than 10-year-old vessels in 1899. Intercepts and slopes,
however, do not remain consistent and do not show any trend across time. For example, 10-year
old vessels in 1894 require fewer engineers than similarly aged vessels in 1884 but more than
similarly aged vessels in 1899. A snapshot of these vintage eects (based on the results from
column (8) of table 2 appears as gure 4.
We also observe a strong inter-skill complementarity - the number of ocers aboard the vessel
is closely associated with the number of engineers. These results may also be endogenous, which
we explore further with IV regressions in a later section of the paper.
One might consider the use of a vessel's age as a proxy for technology. This is defensible on
the basis of the historiography of the navy - technological progress happened in ts and starts,
but it also happened chronologically. Thus the year of a ship's construction might give us a sense
of the technological vintage of the vessel. As gure 4 indicates, however, these vintage eects
27The authors will provide complete set of results for the vintage interaction coecients upon request. Each
chi-squared test is based on 30 degrees of freedom.
22shift over time. The only consistently clear pattern (a negatively sloped function) indicates that
during any given year, older ships had fewer engineers.
Along with improved fuel eciency, a primary goal for the improvement of steaming technology
was to increase the potential cruising speed of a vessel. We have this information for only 80%
of the sample of vessels. Ceteris paribus, vessel speed does not appear to inuence engineer
numbers assigned to ships (results not reported).
Yet even after controlling for the speed (i.e. propulsion technology) of the vessel, a decline in
engineering personnel continues to persist for every year that vessels age. Although we do not
report the estimates for the 29 additional age-cohort interaction terms, the reader can be assured
that these estimates echo the results shown in gure 4.28 We also continue to observe robust
positive eects on engineer numbers from the size of ships. Longer and heavier ships demanded
more engineers on active vessels. These quadratic coecients appear quite small but statistically
signicant, and if anything indicate a leveling-o of the demand for engineers rather than a shift
in direction of the relationship as ships grew in size.
Finally, the typical complement on a ship appears to have no relationship with the assigned
number of engineers. This suggests two things. First, it provides a fortiori evidence of capital-
engineering skill complementarities, as greater numbers of engineers are associated with larger
ships even controlling for overall size of labor. Thus we are not merely capturing a scale eect.
Second, it suggests no engineer-unskilled labor complementarities.
28Again, the authors will provide estimates of interaction coecients upon request.
23Table 3: Poisson regressions of engineers assigned to active vessels on vessel
characteristics (1901-1911)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vessel age 0.015* -0.002 0.022 -0.008 0.044*** 0.070*** 0.033 -0.012
(0.008) (0.012) (0.021) (0.137) (0.016) (0.024) (0.124) (0.201)
vessel age squared - - - - - - 0.0003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.037 0.035 -0.043 -0.053 0.06** -0.025 -0.06 -0.186
(0.018) (0.023) (0.035) (0.036) (0.027) (0.033) (0.082) (0.110)
displacement squared - - - - - - 0.0076 0.012
(0.0047) (0.006)
length (feet) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.001 0.0092** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
length squared - - - - - - 2.25e-6 2.91e-6
(9.50e-6) (8.28e-6)
cum sea - 0.047*** 0.021 0.018 0.050 0036 0.226*** 0.212***
(0.020) (0.038) (0.039) (0.030) (0.035) (0.042) (0.061)
cum sea squared - - - - - - -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.003)
complement - - 0.002*** 0.003*** - 0.0023*** - 0.0071***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0017)
complement squared - - - - - - - 5.80e-6
(1.65e-6)
ocers - 0.024 0.020 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.195*** 0.11**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.055) (0.052)
ocers squared - - - - - - -0.013*** -0.0089***
(0.0035) (0.0029)
observations 531 492 455 455 492 455 492 488
no. of vessels 123 123 113 113 123 113 123 113
pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19 - - 0.20 0.24
year eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no no no yes yes yes yes yes
2 of age*cohort interactions - - - 20.04* 28.66*** 32.21*** 18.48*** 30.84***
random ship eects no no no no yes yes no no
standard errors shown in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24Table 3 presents results for the exact same exercise, but here we look strictly at the 1901-1911
period. This is the period directly following the Amalgamation Act, which ocially abolished
the distinction between line and sta ocers. Our left-hand side variable now is the vessel counts
of erstwhile engineers, who here have regular ocer status and rank, aboard active vessels.
Dierences in results between this and the earlier period are striking. In summary, those
with engineering backgrounds and training appear to have been completely transmogried into
an entirely dierent creature. No longer is there any association between the displacement of
a vessel and the number of engineers (there does remain a positive association between length
and engineer numbers). Rather, there is now a strong relationship between the complement of
the ship and its engineer-oriented crew. Thus scale still matters, but here it appears to operate
through unskilled labor rather than capital.
What about technology? Even without including a measure for speed (which remains insignif-
icant - results not shown), there is no evidence that suggests that newer vessels were linked to
more engineers. That is true whether we do or do not include age-cohort eects.
Finally, the evidence supporting ocer-engineer complementarities is now much weaker.29
In short, the complementarities between engineers and capital, technology and other skilled
laborers embraced by naval strategists in the earlier era appears completely eviscerated with
amalgamation. What is striking here is that the Navy of this era was deploying and embracing
engineer-oriented technologies to an unprecedented degree. One would imagine that the Great
White Fleet would require technocrats to manage and operate complicated machinery and tech-
nologies now more than ever. So did the regular ocer corps pick up the slack? We explore this
possibility in the next section.
5.2 Ocer counts
Conceivably the kinds of skills ocers provided prior to the Amalgamation Act diered from
engineers. To test for dierences, we estimate Poisson specications for the number of ocers
on active vessels from 1870-1899 and present these in table 4.
29There remains a positive association when we include quadratic terms. This suggests that while the ocer-
engineer link may have been important in small numbers, the link breaks down fairly rapidly for larger numbers.
25Table 4: Poisson regressions of ocers assigned to active vessels on vessel
characteristics (1870-1899)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vessel age -0.002* -0.0037* -0.006*** -0.0075 0.165** 0.02 -0.034*** -0.0072
(0.0015) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.017) (0.077) (0.086) (0.010) (0.015)
vessel age squared - - - - - - 0.0005*** -0.0001
(0.00016) (0.0002)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.069*** 0.049*** -0.015 -0.015 0.264 -0.157 0.237*** 0.074*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.0095) (0.17) (0.126) (0.029) (0.042)
displacement squared - - - - - - -0.015*** -0.0047
(0.0021) (0.0030)
length (feet) 0.0007* 0.0005 -0.00005 0.00005 0.011 0.005 0.003** 0.002
(0.0004) (0.00035) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0013) (0.002)
length squared - - - - - - -8.61e-6*** -5.81e-6
(2.59e-6) (3.54e-6)
cum sea - 0.0079** 0.0093** 0.0083*** 0.083* 0.056 0.037*** 0.013
(0.0034) (0.004) (0.0035) (0.045) (0.046) (0.009) (0.0098)
cum sea squared - - - - - - -0.001** -0.00012
(0.0004) (0.00046)
complement - - 0.0013*** 0.0013*** - 0.010*** - 0.003***
(0.00017) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0007)
complement squared - - - - - - - -2.93e-6***
(9.33e-7)
engineers - 0.046*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.21*** 0.161* 0.086*** 0.058*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.079) (0.086) (0.026) (0.030)
engineers squared -0.007*** -0.0048
(0.0025) (0.003)
observations 784 784 579 579 784 579 784 579
no. of vessels 123 123 92 92 123 92 123 92
pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 - - 0.09 0.09
year eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no no no yes yes yes yes yes
2 of age*cohort interactions - - - 44.92*** 66.86*** 47.20*** 102.12*** 39.02*
random ship eects no no no no yes yes no no
standard errors shown in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
26First, while we do nd some evidence of capital-ocer skill complementarity, the evidence
is much weaker in this case. Compared with results in Table 2, the comparable coecients on
displacement are either insignicant or are notably smaller. Further, the coecients on length
tend towards insignicance.
Instead, we nd a very strong association between the total complement aboard vessels and
the number of ocers. This makes sense, as ocers served a primary role as managers of sailors
rather than as direct operators of machinery. This is in stark contrast to the results for engineers.
With respect to technology, evidence for technology-ocer skill is weaker or essentially non-
existent. Columns (1)-(3) show negative coecients on vessel age that are nevertheless much
weaker than corresponding results in Table 2. Further, coecients on age-cohort interaction
terms are all insignicant, again in notable contrast to results for engineers. This is true whether
or not we include speed as an additional control, which also remains insignicant (results not
reported).
The evidence suggests that prior to amalgamation ocers functioned very dierently from
engineers, and the roles and responsibilities of each group profoundly complemented the other.
Notice also that prior engineers in the 20th century behave much like ocers in the 19th
century - they complement unskilled ship personnel but not capital or technology. That is,
erstwhile engineers take on more traditional ocer roles in leadership and management and less
technocratic tasks. Could the reverse be said of ocers in the 20th century?
27Table 5: Poisson regressions of ocers assigned to active vessels on vessel
characteristics (1901-1911)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
vessel age -0.005 -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.04* 0.131** 0.20*** -0.068*** -0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.067) (0.072) (0.022) (0.027)
vessel age squared - - - - - - 0.0006* 0.00007
(0.00035) (0.0005)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.46*** 0.20* 0.029 -0.07**
(0.008) (0.0076) (0.010) (0.01) (0.075) (0.12) (0.029) (0.033)
displacement squared - - - - - - 0.001 0.005***
(0.002) (0.0018)
length (feet) 0.002*** 0.0018*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.005 0.002 0.010*** 0.0078***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0021)
length squared - - - - - - -0.00001*** -0.00001***
(2.43e-6) (3.13e-6)
cum sea - 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.160*** 0.135** 0.065*** 0.021
(0.0076) (0.0084) (0.007) (0.054) (0.058) (0.014) (0.014)
cum sea squared - - - - - - -0.0017** -0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0008)
complement - - 0.0005* 0.00065** - 0.007*** - 0.0045***
(0.00028) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0007)
complement squared - - - - - - - -2.58e-6
(7.13e-7)
engineers - 0.029 0.024 0.014 -0.119 -0.010 0.063 0.016
(0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.17) (0.18) (0.042) (0.054)
engineers squared - - - - - - -0.022 -0.019
(0.014) (0.016)
observations 492 492 455 455 492 455 492 455
no. of vessels 123 123 113 113 123 113 123 113
pseudo R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 - - 0.26 0.28
year eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no no no yes yes yes yes yes
2 of age*cohort interactions - - - 11.54 50.94*** 40.90*** 22.27** 18.65**
random ship eects no no no no yes yes no no
standard errors shown in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28Table 5 presents the results of Poisson regressions of ocers during the Post-Amalgamation
era. The evidence suggests that there was some task convergence from the ocer side as well.
For one, there appear to be stronger capital-skill complementarities. Columns (3)-(6) show
positive and statistically signicant eects of displacement on ocer numbers, whereas none
existed for corresponding regressions for the 19th century. Results for vessel length are also
much stronger for the 20th century compared with the 19th. On the other hand, the positive
association between ship complement and ocers appears notably weaker (at least when we do
not include quadratic terms).
The bottom line is that amalgamation appears to have been \successful," in that engineers
behaved more like ocers and ocers more like engineers. Part of this was surely due to edu-
cational and curricular changes at the Naval Academy, which by the turn of the 20th century
made a robust eort to train the whole brigade in propulsion, metallurgy, and all courses re-
lated to naval engineering. However, as we mentioned earlier there remained resistance to the
Navy's return to omni-competence for its ocer corps, as it related more to competence in the
engineering-focused technologies of the new Navy and not to traditional naval training. Indeed,
a cursory comparison across tables 2-5 may suggest that the old engineering corps was trans-
formed much more radically than the old ocer corps. And as mentioned earlier, there remained
concern that such an asymmetric amalgamation may result in a reactionary corps unprepared
and ill-suited for 20th century, state-of-the-art naval developments.
5.3 Engineer intensity
From our Poisson regressions, it appears that ocers and engineers before 1900 had very
dierent functions on active vessels. To get a somewhat dierent perspective of the engineer skill
intensity required on ships, we estimate the ratio of engineers to ocers on a ship. (Hence we
estimate a relative measure for engineers.) Estimates from these regressions appear in table 6.
29Table 6: Engineer intensity on active vessels (engineers/ocers)
VARIABLES 70-99 70-99 70-99 70-99 01-11 01-11 01-11 01-11
vessel age -0.006** 0.0038 -0.020** -0.0068 0.003 0.007 0.003 -0.004
(0.0029) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.004) (0.01) (0.012) (0.015)
vessel age squared - - 0.0003 0.0003 - - .00008 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) )(0.0004)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.192*** 0.220*** -0.008 -0.009 -0.026 -0.023
(0.016) (0.017) (0.058) (0.064) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
displacement squared - - -0.010*** -0.012*** - - 0.0013 0.001
(0.0036) (0.004) (0.0009) (0.0009)
length (feet) 0.001* 0.0010 -0.0019 -0.002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0009
(0.00058) (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.001)
length squared - - 2.97e-6 2.28e-6 - - -3.63e-7 -7.38e-7
(3.23e-6) (3.14e-6) (1.23e-6) (1.36e-6)
cum sea 0.006 0.010** 0.19*** 0.022*** 0.003 0.003 0.024* 0.034**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
cum sea squared - - -0.0004* -0.0003 - - -0.001** -0.0016**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
complement -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.001* -0.0013** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.00025) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
complement squared - - 7.28e-7 9.34e-7 - - -2.75e-7 -1.61e-7
(6.87e-7) (6.83e-7) (2.06e-7) (2.12e-7)
observations 563 563 563 563 435 435 435 435
no. of vessels 92 92 92 92 112 112 112 112
pseudo R2 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24
year eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no yes no yes no yes no yes
2 of age*cohort interactions - 330.31*** - 265.82*** - 20.83** - 24.50**
standard errors shown in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results here echo those from Poisson regressions. During the pre-amalgamation period (columns
1-4), we nd a consistently positive relationship between ship displacement and engineer to ocer
ratios. Thus the \scale eect" of larger more capital-intensive vessels creating greater demands
for skilled labor occurred asymmetrically. Yet if we \scale" ships by complement size, we nd the
reverse. More unskilled labor assigned to vessels was associated with smaller engineer-to-ocer
ratios. Thus the greater demands for skilled personnel on larger vessels were not merely due to
scale through constant returns - they were also biased towards particular skills.
Further, older vessels are associated with smaller engineer-ocer ratios. When we include
age-cohort interaction terms, the average age eect disappears but the interaction terms are
negative and statistically signicant. Thus naval technologies evolving over time in the 19th
30century appear to be biased towards engineers.
The post-amalgamation age (columns 5-8) paints a starkly dierent picture. With the excep-
tion of cumulative sea experience, there are no statistically signicant coecients. After 1900,
there are essentially no statistically discernible dierences between engineers and ocers. This
provides further evidence on the eective convergence between the two.
5.4 Instrumental variable strategy
As discussed in section 3:1:1 and outlined in Mullahy (1997), Poisson specications with an
endogenous variable produce biased estimates. In particular, the number of ocers on a ship is
likely endogenous in engineer regressions for the pre-amalgamated Navy, as ocers and engineers
likely were simultaneously assigned to ships. Following Wooldridge (2002), we can conrm the
endogeneity of ocers by rst estimating the residuals from an OLS regression of ocers on
age, displacement, length, cumulative sea and complement, as well as cohort and time eects.
We then estimate a Poisson regression similar to column (4) of table 3 and include the residuals
from the rst stage as an additional covariate. The p-value associated with these residuals in the
second stage equals 0:002, a result that makes it appear desirable to use IVs.
We use the complement (the number of enlisted sailors) of a ship as an instrument and justify
this based on two claims. First, complement is a rather strong predictor of the number of
ocers on a vessel. In fact, it is the only robust predictor of the number of ocers assigned to
a vessel in OLS specications. As table 5 highlights, most Poisson specications also support
this claim. Quite condently, we can state that complement robustly predicts approximately
26% of the variance in ocer appointments on vessels.30 Secondly, a test does not exist to prove
instrument exogeneity in exactly identied models as estimated here. We can claim, however,
with a fair amount of statistical support that complement has no statistically signicant eect on
the number of engineers. Although it strongly correlates with the size of ships and the number of
ocers serving on ships, in repeated specications (as shown in Appendix table A2), complement
has no direct eect on the assignment of engineers to vessels.
30Results of various OLS rst-stage specications are reported in Appendix A1).
31Table 7: IV regressions of engineers serving on active vessels (1870-99)
QML OLS GMM 2S-QML 2SLS
(Poisson) (Linear) (IV transformation) (Poisson) (Linear)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
age of vessel -0.019 0.009 -0.084 -0.019 0.007
(0.024) (0.021) (0.060) (0.024) (0.020)
disp. (1000 tons) 0.099*** 0.137*** 0.155*** 0.101*** 0.131***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021)
length (feet) 0.0023** 0.002*** 0.0014 0.002** 0.002**
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007)
cumulative sea 0.013 0.010 0.034*** 0.014 0.009
(0.0010) (0.007) (0.0106) (0.010) (0.006)
ocers 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.053* 0.045*** 0.051**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.032) (0.013) (0.024)
observations 579 562 579 579 562
number of vessels all specications include the 92 vessels with data for ship complement
Columns (1) & (2) included as baseline, not estimated with instrumental variables.
Columns (3) - (5) include complement as an identifying instruments.
Columns (4) and (5) use d officers as regressors estimated from linear rst stage regressions.
For marginal eect comparisons, columns (2) & (5) use ln(engineers) as the dependent variable.
All specications include year (cohort) eects as well as age*cohort interactions.
Signicance implied by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2SQML standard errors not adjusted.
Table 7 summarizes output from IV regressions and corresponding uncorrected estimates
for comparison. Results from baseline (uncorrected) Poisson regressions appear in column (1),
while the semi-elasticities from an OLS regression that uses the natural log of engineers as the
dependent variable appear in column (2). The IV problem is tackled using the three alternative
strategies: the Mullahy (1997) GMM estimator (column (3)), a 2-stage quasi-maximum likelihood
procedure (column (4)), and a two-stage least squares estimator (column (5)). Aside from the
coecient for ocers, the core set of coecients remain robust to IV corrections. In general, an
increase in the number of ocers on ships results in a corresponding increase in vessel needs for
engineers.
So far the analysis suggests that there was a great deal of labor specialization, but only before
amalgamation. As we have described, amalgamation was motivated by rising communication
and coordination costs within the corps, as well as the fear that division within the eet could
stie technological developments and paralyze naval strategy. But amalgamation generated its
own concern that a homogenous corps would be a less technologically savvy one, and this could
32itself endanger technological progress. However, while the post-amalgamation Navy was limited
in its ability to specialize along the extensive margin of human capital (ocer versus engineer),
it could perhaps allocate tasks along more intensive margins of human capital, and thus could
help it continue to operate complex and engineer-oriented technologies. We explore the roles of
these intensive measures of human capital on specialization patterns in the following sections.
5.5 Personnel Experience
On the job experience can serve as a proxy for human capital development in a number of
ways. One, work experience can produce rm or industry-specic knowledge accumulation. Two,
technological or structural changes within the industry can either augment or erode one's existing
level of human capital through work experience over time. If workers receive formal education
prior to working, job experience measures may capture the vintage of such education.
We have two dierent measures of worker job tenure, originating from two separate sources.
The rst comes from Bennett (1896), which lists the names and start dates of every engineer
who served in the Navy, from its inception to 1896.31 We match the data with navy registry
information to construct an average experience measure for the longevity of service for engineering
personnel assigned to vessels. The second measure documents the average experience of all
ocers (line and engineer) associated with active vessels; this comes from linking ocers listed
in navy registers with their Naval Academy proles (these indicate year of graduation). Thus
the former measure includes all engineers but no line ocers, while the latter contains all line
and engineer ocers but no uncommissioned engineers. Note also that our Naval Academy
documentation only goes back to 1865 - earlier observations for our second measure will then
systematically over-report experience. The inclusion of year eects helps us control for such
systematic bias.
31We are able to extrapolate the information up to 1899.
33Table 8: Average Experience of Engineers
on Active Vessels (in days, 1870-1899)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
age 36.35** 30.06 -30.94
(16.61) (21.1) (68.99)
displacement (1000 tons) -338.6*** -222.4*** -259.81***
(52.59) (75.70) (81.19)
length 4.12 1.62 2.79
(3.06) (3.02) (3.17)
cum sea 0.23 0.186 -0.269
(0.278) (0.328) (0.397)
complement - -1.05 -0.94
(1.20) (1.15)
observations 735 543 543
number of vessels 123 92 92
overall R2 0.55 0.53 0.56
year eects yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no no yes
Random eects included for all regressions (FGLS)
Bootstrap standard errors shown in parentheses, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8 displays results from FGLS regressions of average engineer experience associated with
active vessels on vessel characteristics.32 Strikingly, older vessels (measured either through age
or age-cohort interactions) are associated with more experienced engineers, while more capital-
intensive vessels (measured by displacement) are associated with less experienced engineers. This
likely captures human capital vintage eects, as earlier-trained engineers were likely less familiar
with the workings of newer and more advanced vessels. Thus newer and larger ships were manned
by younger and larger groups of engineers, a result that we would expect in an environment with
capital- and technology-skill complementarities.
32The inclusion of speed measures do not meaningfully alter results. The inclusion of quadratic terms somewhat
weaken the results.
34Table 9: Average Experience of All Ocers
on Active Vessels (in years, 1870-1899)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
age 0.028* 0.073 0.017 -0.011
(0.015) (0.051) (0.020) (0.10)
displacement (1000 tons) -0.27** -0.27** -0.23* -0.19
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
length 0.0007 0.0003 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
cum sea -0.023 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.035) (0.03) (0.035)
complement - - -0.004 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.0023)
ocers -0.049 -0.048 -0.027 -0.20
(0.037) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
engineers -0.245*** -0.233*** -0.190*** -0.178***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.055) (0.059)
observations 746 746 552 552
number of vessels 118 118 88 88
overall R2 0.84 084 0.84 0.84
year eects yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no yes no yes
Random eects included for all regressions (FGLS)
Bootstrap standard errors shown in parentheses, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
These results are generally echoed when we look at all ocers assigned to active vessels (Table
9), although the results are somewhat weaker. Even after controlling for the number of engineers
(who tend to be systematically younger than their line-ocer counterparts) more experienced
members of the ocer corps tend to be assigned to less capital-intensive vessels.
These ndings are only for the 19th century, yet they do suggest another avenue for the 20th
century Navy to allocate human capital across its eet. As the Naval Academy adjusted its
curriculum to meet the needs of the modernizing eet, it stands to reason that newer and less
seasoned personnel would better serve more modern vessels. Such an allocation strategy could
mitigate potentially negative eects arising from amalgamation.
5.6 Personnel Education
Another intensive measure of human capital includes the education ocers received while
students at the Naval Academy. For the graduating classes of 1865 - 1905, we document each
ocer's rst-year order of merit (this tends to capture basic prociency in math, science and
35languages) and overall order of merit (over all four years), as well as class rank in four specic
subjects - steam engineering, seamanship, ordnance and gunnery, and navigation.33 Dividing
rank measures by graduating class size gives us percentile score measures for each ocer. We
use these percentile scores to produce average human capital measures associated with active
vessels, as well as maximum and minimum scores.
Perhaps not surprisingly, we do not get any statistically signicant results when we regress
average ocer education measures on ship characteristics. Each ship crew consisted of a motley
mix of ocers with varying academic performance scores - averages appear merely to wash away
this heterogeneity. However, regressing the top score obtained by a member of the ship crew
on ship characteristics produces some interesting results. The most striking ndings are those
pertaining to steam engineering (Table 10) and rst-year scores (Table 11).
33These four sub-elds tend to have the most consistency and relevance across graduating classes and years
(Glaser and Rahman 2011).
36Table 10: Maximum Steam Engineering Percentile on Ship Characteristics
(1870-1911)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
vessel age -0.002** -0.0084** -0.007** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
vessel age squared - - - 0.0002**
(0.00008)
vessel speed - - 0.009** 0.045**
(0.004) (0.020)
vessel speed squared - - - -0.0012**
(0.00055)
displacement (1000 tons) -0.002 -0.0006 0.0024 0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
displacement squared - - - -0.0005
(0.0005)
length (feet) 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007)
length squared - - - -9.65e-7
(1.01e-6)
ocers 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.020**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.008)
ocers squared - - - -0.0006
(0.0004)
engineers 0.0003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
engineers squared - - - 0.001
(0.0009)
observations ocers 1212 1212 1094 1094
no. of vessels 205 205 188 188
overall R2 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27
year eects yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no yes no yes
Random eects included for all regressions (FGLS)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37Table 11: Maximum First-Year Percentile on Ship Characteristics
(1870-1911)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
vessel age -0.002* -0.010** -0.007 -0.005
(0.00085) (0.0045) (0.004) (0.005)
vessel age squared - - - -0.00005
(0.00009)
vessel speed - - 0.011** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.018)
vessel speed squared - - - -0.002***
(0.0005)
displacement (1000 tons) 0.0005 0.002 0.0048 0.009
(0.0031) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011)
displacement squared - - - -0.0002
(0.0005)
length (feet) 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007)
length squared - - - 3.65e-7
(9.31e-7)
ocers 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.016**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.008)
ocers squared - - - -0.0004
(0.0004)
engineers 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.0025
(0.0029) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
engineers squared - - - 0.0004
(0.0010)
observations ocers 1216 1216 1098 1098
no. of vessels 205 205 188 188
overall R2 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.28
year eects yes yes yes yes
age*cohort interactions no yes no yes
Random eects included for all regressions (FGLS)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When we consider steam engineering scores, there does appear to be ability-technology com-
plementarities. As before, newer vessels are associated with greater engineering skill. This time
however, we measure skill as the skill pertaining to only one individual. Both for pre- and post-
amalgamated navies, what appears to matter is not that the entire crew is good at engineering,
but rather at least someone is good at engineering. Again this points to further specialization;
as those with stellar engineering backgrounds were tasked with the newer aspects of naval op-
erations, other ocers could focus on more traditional tasks. Note that these age eects are
38quite strong. In contrast to our previous count analysis, vessel age remains negatively related to
engineering skill even when we control for age-cohort eects (these are also negative).
Another new feature now is that vessel speed positively predicts engineering skill. Specically,
each knot is associated with anywhere between 1 and 4.5 extra percentile points of higher engi-
neering scores for the highest-scoring member of the crew. Further, our age eects remain robust
even with the inclusion of speed. The bottom line is that we observe signicant technology-skill
(but no capital-skill) complementarities when we focus on the ocer with the highest demon-
strated ability in steam engineering.34
What about other subject areas? Here the results are notably weaker or nonexistent. Tellingly,
steam engineering skills appear to be the most important skill for a crew member to be linked
up with more advanced ship technology.35 That includes our percentile scores for overall order
of merit. However, as demonstrated in Table 11, maximum rst-year percentile scores are also
positively related technological proxies. During this time (and even today) rst-year classes at
the Naval Academy were devoted almost entirely to basic subjects (math, history, English) and
virtually no course focused on navy-specic material. This may suggest that rst-year scores
proxy for basic or general knowledge (as opposed to navy-specic knowledge), and one who has
such knowledge may benet the crew of a technologically sophisticated vessel more than anyone
with traditional naval skills.
Again, the results suggest that the Navy was able to match skills with capital and technologies
with more subtlety than just through the extensive margin of matching ocers with some tasks
and engineers with others. As amalgamation obscured and ultimately obliterated the distinction
between line and engineer ocers, the Navy had the ability to compensate by matching through
more intensive human capital measures like education and experience.
6 Conclusion
As the nation proceeded through the second Industrial Revolution, naval vessels became in-
creasingly more technical. The most advanced vessels (faster, heavier and newer) required larger
34The inclusion of complement does not produce a statistically signicant coecient, does not signicantly alter
our coecients, and simply limits the number of observations.
35Detailed results for all subjects available upon request.
39shares of technically-procient workers for operation. Skilled workers were highly specialized,
and the late-19th century Navy was one where complementarities abounded.36
Yet in the early 20th century, when engineer-oriented technologies were being rapidly devel-
oped and implemented, we observe far less labor specialization. This was because the eciency
gains that typically arise from specialization did not appear to outweigh the large communication
and coordination costs associated with a divided corps. The Navy was still able to link capital
and technologies with more intensive human capital measures, but the extensive divide between
line and sta was dead by 1900.
The U.S. Navy today remains committed to the model of the omni-competent naval o-
cer, employing policies such as the \division ocer shue" where ocer reassignments occur
frequently to produce well-rounded sailors. This paper studies the antecedents of our current
military paradigm. Yet the study also oers historical lessons on the dynamics of change perti-
nent to nonmilitary societies as well. The tradeos of labor specialization, and how organizations
restructure when technologies change, should be a valuable study for businesses of all kinds.
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43Figure 1: Age and displacement proles of active vessels
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44Figure 2: Complement and speed proles on active vessels
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45Figure 3: Numbers of skilled labor on active vessels
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Table A1: First-Stage OLS for Ocers (used in IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3)
complement 0.0104*** 0.0107*** 0.0108***
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0008)
age of vessel -0.0720 - -
(0.0676)
displacement (tons) -0.00002 - -
(0.0001)
length (feet) 0.0011 - -
(0.0036)
cumulative sea 0.0763** - -
(0.0341)
observations 563 includes only observations with complement data
number of vessels 87
-squared test of age*cohort interactions 0.82 1.10 -
R2 0.4374 0.4324 0.2636
Model t F-stat 6.63 6.53 210.9
Columns (1)-(4) include year eects as well as age*cohort interactions.
Signicance implied by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2: (Lack of ) eect for Complement on Engineers
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
complement 0.0005 0.0006** 0.0002 0.0002 0.00008 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.00008)
complement-squared - - - - - -1.7e-6
(1.3e-6)
observations 563 includes only observations with ship complement data
number of vessels 87
each column represents same specication as table 3 with addition of complement regressor(s)
other coecients not reported
standard errors in parentheses, bootstrap estimators except in random eects specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
48